THE SUPREME COURT
HISTORICAL SOCIETY

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Society Dedicates Headquarters To Two Founding Trustees

At a specially called meeting held on September 29, 1983, the Society's Board of Trustees dedicated the organization's new headquarters building to the memory of Elizabeth Hughes Gossett. In the company of many old friends and other honored guests, the Board also named a room in the building to the memory of another founding trustee, Robert T. Stevens. Mrs. Gossett, the youngest child of Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes, served from 1974-1980 as the first president of the Society. Under her distinguished leadership, the Society set its course and inaugurated its first activities. Though her subsequent tenure as Chairman of the Board was cut short by her untimely death in 1981, Elizabeth Hughes Gossett left a unique stamp on the Society which will continue to guide the Society's future for a long time.

The Board also paid special tribute to Robert T. Stevens, who succeeded Justice Tom C. Clark as Chairman of the Board in 1978. A committed supporter of the Society and its work, Mr. Stevens' deep sense of caring encouraged others to give their serious attention and best efforts to the concerns of the Society. His death in 1983 brought to a close a very important chapter in the organization's history.

The Chief Justice (right) greets Mrs. Robert T. Stevens and her son Whitney Stevens in the Robert T. Stevens Reading Room.

The Society's Honorary Chairman, Chief Justice Warren Burger (center), and Board Chairman Kenneth Rush (left), join William T. Gossett in front of the dedication plaque honoring Mrs. Gossett.

Long an objective of both Mr. Stevens and Mrs. Gossett, the headquarters project was commenced in 1979 with a preliminary search for an appropriate location. A building near the Court was eventually found in 1982. The necessary remodelling and renovations were sufficiently completed by the Spring of this year to enable the Society to take occupancy prior to the Annual Meeting in May. Now completed, the new facility will serve as a lasting memorial to two of the Society's founders, and as a tribute to the many individual members, foundations, and special friends who helped make the project possible through their dedicated support and generous contributions.

Prodigy Before the Court: James Garfield and *Ex parte Milligan*

by Meyer Rothwacks*

One of the most memorable cases of 1866 to come before the Supreme Court was that of *Ex parte Milligan* which established the limits of military jurisdiction under martial law and reasserted the separation of powers under the American Constitution. In 1864, Lambdin P. Milligan, an accused Confederate conspirator, was sentenced by a military commission in Indiana to be hung for his alleged involvement in a plot to release and arm rebel prisoners. Though civilian courts were in session at the time, local Army officials presumed the authority to try Milligan in a military court as a result of President Lincoln's declaration of martial law. It was this jurisdictional question, and not Milligan's guilt or innocence in fact, which eventually brought the case before the Supreme Court.

Ironically, while Lincoln's declaration of martial law provided the basis for Milligan's initial trial and imprisonment, one other President and a third man destined to occupy the White House would act independently to rescue Milligan from his harsh fate. Anxious to begin a reconciliation, Lincoln's successor, Andrew Johnson, sought to demonstrate the victorious Union's benevolence to the vanquished southern states, and in a token gesture he commuted Milligan's sentence to life imprisonment. While this act in no way reversed the military's asserted right to try Milligan and his co-conspirators in the first place, it did give the defendants time to continue their appeals, which ultimately reached the Supreme Court in 1866.

Courtesy, Library of Congress

James A. Garfield

At this junction, future President James A. Garfield became involved in the case at the request of his law partner, Jerimiah Black, who was then serving as Milligan's legal counsel. As this was to be Garfield's first initiation as a litigation attorney it probably serves as a unique example of an untried novice winning a stunning victory in what would become a landmark case in the annals of Supreme Court history.

Almost as surprising as Garfield's litigatory debut in *Ex parte Milligan* was his unlikely entry into the legal profession to begin with. Born to poor and religious farm folk in an authentic log cabin in Cuyahoga County, Ohio, Garfield was probably the last American president to claim so humble a beginning. His was an Horatio Alger-like rise to the highest office in the land. With little formal education before his eighteenth year, which nevertheless included extensive reading in the classics, he entered the Western Eclectic Institute, later known as Hiram College. The school was sponsored by the Disciples of Christ, a religious group to which Garfield was devoted all his life. Upon graduation, he entered Williams College and in both schools distinguished himself and demonstrated particular talents in oratory and debate. As noted in his comprehensive diaries, Garfield loved "argumentation and investigation and the glory of defending unpopular truth against popular error." He returned to the Eclectic Institute as principal and teacher and is said to have turned down an opportunity to head Williams College.

Although Garfield considered teaching as a career, he became disenchanted with the idea when an attempt was made to oust him as principal of the Eclectic Institute. He also thought of becoming a lawyer; in a letter to his future wife regarding the tribulations of academic life, he confessed that he was "sometimes so disgusted with the whole thing as to be almost resolved to throw (the academic life) all away and go to the more 'liberal deeds of the Law.'"

Garfield was admitted to the bar in Ohio in 1859, but by then his interest had already focused on politics, having been elected a few months earlier to the Ohio Senate on an anti-slavery platform. However, his vehement opposition to slavery and secession forced him to interrupt his political career during the Civil War to carry the struggle from the statehouse to the battlefield. By 1863, when he resigned his commission in the Army to take a seat in Congress, he had attained the rank of Major General in the Ohio Volunteers and had served meritoriously in the battle of Chickamauga.

Why Garfield may have chosen to return to politics and not the law is suggested by several of his diary entries and letters which express grave doubts about the profession on moral, religious and intellectual grounds. Made at a time when he was contemplating a theological career, Garfield commented upon a close friend's recent admission to the bar:

> *From his habits of industry and perserverence he will doubtless make his mark in the world if he lives. Were it not for the religion of Christ I should long ago have placed my mark in that direction, and though I do not regard the Legal Profession incompatible with christianity, still, I think it would be much more difficult to cultivate and preserve that purity of heart, and devotedness to the cause of Christ, when Gentlemen of the Bar."*

In a letter to a friend, Garfield also wrote: "When I ask who are the intellectual leaders of our people, I find not the lawyers, but the teachers, the preachers, educators and authors — Hopkins, Hildreth, Silliman, Agassiz, Beecher, Chapman, King, Greeley, Holmes, Emerson & c." As he wrote to his wife in 1860, "I am not at all sure that the profession of law will suite my nature and taste. I may loathe its weary details and long again for work which has more to do with the good of others and with the unselfish side of life."

It was this commitment to justice which led Garfield to accede to the request of his law partner in 1866 to make one of three arguments before the Supreme Court in defense of Milligan and his co-conspirators. Though politically and ideologically opposed to the defendants, Garfield objected to the apparent repudiation of constitutional guarantees by the government for the sake of expediency. When his legal partner Black, a prominent Democrat, warned Garfield that his fellow Republicans would likely seek political recriminations against him for representing traitors, the future President did not flinch. When Black's warning indeed came true, Garfield responded to his critics with a stern rebuke:

> *If the case turns on the justice of those men being duly punished I will not defend them in any way whatever, for I believe they deserve the strictest punishment; but if it turns on the question as to who has the power to try these men, I will. I believe there is no authority under the Constitution and the laws of the United States to take a citizen of Indiana not a soldier and import a military tribunal to his home to try him and punish him. So important did I regard this principle to the future of this country in that exciting time, that, with my eyes open to the fact that I took a very great political risk in defending, not Bowles and Milligan, but the right of every citizen in a civil community where war is not raging to be tried by the courts of the country and before juries of his own land, and not be dragged away outside of his own doors by a military organization brought from a distance, I made the argument now complained of. I believe that, having put down the Rebellion, having saved liberty in this country against cruel invasion, we ought to save it from our own recklessness.*

In the end Garfield's presentation to the Court proved to be an equally eloquent plea on behalf of his controversial clients. His argument was instrumental, not in disproving Milligan's guilt, but in disavowing the government's right to try civilians in a military tribunal when civilian courts remained open and unimpeded in the pursuit of their duties. Garfield's own modest assessment of his performance was that "it was not altogether a failure."

Ironically, Garfield never received a penny's compensation for his work in the case, and even had to pay the cost of printing his own brief and argument. Undoubtedly, he enjoyed the unique satisfaction of making his very first appearance before the high court a successful one, and in a case of such historical proportion. That he took pride in his achievement is apparent from his observation of the paths of others to the Court and the unspoken comparison to his own:

> *The regular channels are to study in a lawyer's office, sweep the office for a year or two, then to pettifog in a justice court, and slowly and gradually after being sub to everybody, when older heads begin to die, the man feels his way as a lawyer, and after he has been 15 or 20 years in practice, if he even gets a case into the Supreme Court, and gets admitted there, it is considered a red letter day in his history when he does it.*

Garfield's service in the *Milligan* case proved the high point of his legal career, though he continued to litigate an amazing variety of cases for the next eleven years, several of which reached the Supreme Court. Following barely a decade in private practice, Garfield returned again to politics. He played a prominent role on the 1876 election commission which confirmed the disputed election of Republican candidate Rutherford B. Hayes over his Democratic opponent Samuel J. Tilden. While a Senator-elect from Ohio, Garfield served as campaign manager for fellow Ohioan John Sherman's presidential bid in the 1880 Republican convention. Deadlocked for 35 ballots, the convention nominated Garfield on the 36th ballot as the party's presidential nominee. Garfield defeated his Democratic opponent, but only five months after taking office he was tragically felled by an assassin's bullet. He died two months later on September 19, 1881, in Elberon, New Jersey.

As for Lambdin P. Milligan, he continued to arouse Union animosities; upon his release from prison, he sued the government for damages arising from his false imprisonment. The jury, forced to recognize the validity of his claim, was apparently unwilling to overlook the basis for his conviction. They found in his favor, and awarded as damages the sum of five dollars!

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Philip Pendleton Barbour: The Pride of Virginia

Philip Pendleton Barbour, the "pride of the democracy of Virginia," was an advocate of state sovereignty, southern rights, and strict constitutional interpretation. Loyal to the social and political traditions of antebellum Virginia, he aligned himself against the federalist leaders of his day, including Henry Clay, John Quincy Adams, and his own brother, James Barbour. A leading member of Congress and Speaker of the House, Barbour was a serious contender for the Presidency whose distinguished career as a public servant terminated with his five-year tenure as an associate justice of the Supreme Court of the United States.

Born May 25, 1783, into an aristocratic Virginia family with depleted financial resources, Philip Barbour was raised as a member of the Old Dominion's tidewater gentry. His father, Thomas Barbour, the grandson of a Scottish merchant who settled in Virginia in the late 1600s, was an Orange County planter who served in the Virginia House of Burgesses, and after the Revolution, the General Assembly. His mother, Mary Pendleton Thomas, was the daughter of another wealthy planter, and related to many of the region's most distinguished jurists and political leaders.

Perhaps because of Thomas Barbour's other interests, his financial situation was less secure than many of his social peers, and he was frequently in debt. As a result, Philip did not receive the formal education typical of the sons of Virginia's aristocracy. As a young boy, he came under the tutelage of a local Episcopal clergyman, Reverend Charles O'Neil, whose strict discipline included severe whippings. Although instilling in his young charge an early respect for hard work and well-maintained order, O'Neil's method may also explain Barbour's notable indifference to matters of the Church.

In 1804, eager and exuberant to prove himself, the seventeen-year-old left eastern Virginia and travelled to Kentucky with the hope of establishing himself in his own law practice. Although Barbour had shown great aptitude as a student, mastering foreign languages and reading the classics, his limited education apparently left him unprepared for the challenge. Within a year, he returned to Virginia, borrowed some money, and enrolled at the College of William and Mary in Williamsburg. After completing one term, he left the school to practice law in his home state. Such limited training was not uncommon at the time, especially for sons of the gentry. Philip prospered sufficiently to marry Frances Todd Johnson in 1804 and start a family which would in time include seven children. His wife was the daughter of Benjamin Johnson, a prosperous Orange County planter whose family was already connected with the Barbours; Philip's older brother, James, had married Johnson's older daughter seven years earlier.

At the age of 29, Philip Barbour followed the career of his father and older brother; in 1812 he entered political life by being elected to the Virginia House of Delegates from Orange County. His reputation as a lawyer and his family's prominence in state politics gained for him important committee appointments on the judiciary and finance committees, appointments atypical for junior members of the House. Only two years later, Barbour was elected to the U.S. House of Representatives having spent far less than the

Courtesy, Library of Congress

Associate Justice Philip Pendleton Barbour (1836-1841)

usual time proving himself in Richmond.

Philip's rapid rise in Virginia politics was undoubtedly aided by his brother's success, both as Governor of Virginia and as a U.S. Senator. The younger brother, however, had already begun to demonstrate a marked degree of independence when he arrived in Washington to join the Virginia delegation. James Barbour increasingly favored a strong national government, a position that Virginia's James Madison and James Monroe had supported during their presidencies. Philip opposed this nationalist trend, associating himself with a conservative group of "true" Virginians loyal to traditional southern causes. Known as the "Richmond Junta," the group of "Old Republicans" included John Taylor of Caroline, John Randolph of Roanoke, and Thomas Ritchie and Spencer Roane of Richmond. These men saw more clearly than many of their contemporaries the long range effect of the ebbing dominance of Virginia over national politics—a dominance highlighted by the fact that from 1789 to 1825 the White House was occupied for all but four years by sons of Virginia. Only if states' rights were vigorously defended and jealously protected could Virginia—and the South—be assured continuing prosperity, a prosperity based upon traditional social values and practices which included the institution of slavery.

In 1817 Philip openly broke with his brother over legislation known as the "Bonus Bill." The bill would have authorized the federal government to subsidize the construction of roads and canals, and in particular, a so-called "national road" from Buffalo to New Orleans. Opposed to what he viewed as the unwarranted encroachment of the national government on state prerogatives, Barbour vehemently attacked the legislation, labeling it "a bill to construct a road from the liberties of the Country by way of Washington to despotism." The bill, which was passed over Philip Barbour's opposition in the House and with James Barbour's support in the Senate, was vetoed by President Madison, who endorsed the younger Barbour's argument that the Constitution did not grant to the national government the authority to finance such projects.

In 1819, Philip Barbour again rose to debate a controversial motion before the House, proposing the censure of General Andrew Jackson. Jackson, whose victory over the British at the Battle of New Orleans in 1815 had established him as a national hero, had shocked the Congress by his management of a military campaign in Spanish Florida. In particular, "Old Hickory" had ordered two British agents, Arbuthnot and Armbrister, executed for inciting and aiding insurrection against the United States. Barbour, rallying a vigorous defense, sought to justify the order and vindicate the officer in command:

Courtesy, Library of Congress

James Barbour

> *that officer, whose distinguished services have identified his name with the character of his country, has . . . no ambition, but one, to serve his country. . . . In such a case as this . . . I will not vote for censure, for I weigh the acts of every moral agent by the intention.*

Barbour concluded by adding that though the sentence ordered was severe and swiftly administered, it was warranted under the circumstances, effecting a just resolution of the situation encountered. Barbour's eloquent defense was apparently persuasive, as the censure motion was defeated by the House.

In 1821, Barbour served as counsel for Virginia in the celebrated case of *Cohens* v. *Virginia*. Arguing that the Constitution provided the defendant no right of appeal from the decision of the state court to the federal judiciary, Barbour forcefully opposed the implied extension of federal jurisdiction by the Supreme Court. Daniel Webster complained that having lost the case before the Marshall Court, Barbour was still rearguing the case before the Congress three years later. Perhaps as a result of Barbour's concern over the growing power of the Court, he introduced an unsuccessful bill in 1829 which would have required the concurrence of five of the seven justices in any case or controversy involving a constitutional question.

Barbour's defense of states' rights before the Court reflected his understanding of the system of government created by the Constitution. For Barbour, the concept of a state had "a fixed and determinate meaning" which presumed "the existence of a political community, free and independent, and entitled to exercise all the rights of sovereignty" except those specifically granted and conveyed to the national government by the federal charter. Barbour believed those powers of government reserved by the states to be exclusively state matters; the question of slavery was preeminently a matter to be resolved by each state.

Following a decade of distinguished leadership by Henry Clay, John W. Taylor of New York was elected Speaker of the House in 1820. An ardent pro-Adams nationalist, Taylor argued forcefully for the abolition of slavery. The following year, Barbour defeated Taylor, serving as Speaker for the next two years. During his tenure as leader of the House, the competition between Barbour and his predecessors in the chair frequently extended into vigorous floor debates over tariffs, domestic improvements, and the growing jurisdiction and power of the federal judiciary. In 1823, signaling a shift in the mood of the body, Clay regained the Speaker's chair.

Perhaps as a result of the strain of his years of legislative leadership, Barbour did not stand for reelection in 1824, choosing instead to return to private practice and private life. Thomas Jefferson, retired from public life and ensconced as the "sage of Monticello" quickly obtained for his neighbor and friend a law professorship at the newly founded University of Virginia, but Barbour respectfully declined the offer. Soon thereafter he accepted appointment to the Virginia General Court for the Eastern District, serving as a judge of that Court for the next two years.

Barbour's decision to retire from public life may also have been affected by the election of John Quincy Adams, and the prominent position his brother James held in the Adams Administration. For Adams and his nationalist politics, Philip Barbour had scant respect; he objected to the large expenditures of public funds favored by special interests for public works projects, and opposed the imposition of a tariff as unjust and detrimental to the economy of southern states. Convinced by his friends that he was needed in Washington, Barbour agreed to stand for election. He resigned from the Court in 1827, and won reelection to the House unopposed in his district. He immediately became a candidate for Speaker but was defeated in a three-way race which included John Taylor and fellow Virginian, Andrew Stevenson, compromise candidate and ultimate victor. Al-

—*continued on next page*

Barbour *(continued from page five)*

though Barbour failed to regain the Speaker's chair, he remained the legislative leader of the House's conservative states' rights wing. Despite the fact that his brother James was a member of the President's Cabinet, Barbour was a harsh opponent of the administration. Shortly after his return to the House, he sought to make the government's part ownership and business dealings with the Bank of the United States a political issue, introducing a bill to sever the government's involvement with what he considered a private commercial enterprise. His attempt proved premature and the bill was soundly defeated. Although the Bank failed to become an issue during the presidential election of 1828, the matter was not forgotten by Andrew Jackson who soon made it an important part of his populist platform.

In 1829, Barbour's political prominence was highlighted by his election to succeed James Monroe as President of the Virginia Constitutional Convention. A great assembly of distinguished statesmen, the convention struggled to resolve issues in 1829-1830 which three decades later would split Virginia and the nation in two. In the chief controversies which marked the convention, Barbour identified himself with the state's conservative eastern slaveholders. Members of the convention from Virginia's western counties, which included what is now the state of West Virginia, opposed legislative apportionment based on census figures which included slaves. Barbour endorsed a "compound ratio" based on white population and "property" combined, and regarded some landed interest, though not necessarily a freehold, as an essential qualification for the suffrage. With the English political philosopher Edmund Burke, Barbour affirmed that all men are created free and equal in their natural rights, but denied that "all men are entitled to an equal share of political power." "Is not some landed qualification", asked Barbour, "the best surety for such a permanent interest in the community as justly entitles any citizen to the exercise of this right?" Barbour maintained that the abundant availability of real property in the Commonwealth refuted the argument that such a requirement would limit the franchise to Virginia's tidewater aristocracy.

Following Andrew Jackson's election as president, Barbour's name was frequently mentioned as a possible appointee to high office, and Barbour's name circulated as a possible candidate for Secretary of War in the new Cabinet. Although grateful for Barbour's support, Jackson could not count on the Virginian as one of his loyal supporters, and may well have viewed the judicial appointment as an effective means of ending Barbour's political career. Jackson clearly favored Martin Van Buren as a future running mate and likely successor, and to this end worked to have Van Buren nominated as the party's vice-presidential candidate in 1832. Originally suggested to Jackson as a member of his Cabinet by Vice President Calhoun, Van Buren quickly proved his undivided loyalty to the President, alienating Calhoun and other members of the party. Van Buren's candidacy pleased few southern conservatives for another reason; despite his respectable record on states' rights issues, Van Buren was considered unreliable on the slavery issue. Working to defeat Van Buren's nomination, southern leaders in several states organized a Jackson-Barbour movement. Fearing a split in the party, Barbour withdrew from the campaign, and in the name of party unity urged his supporters to back the national ticket.

Courtesy, Library of Congress

Courtesy, Library of Congress

Although a political friend of Philip Barbour, President Andrew Jackson (left) chose Martin Van Buren (right) as his running mate in 1832 in reward for Van Buren's loyal service as a member of his Cabinet.

Courtesy Frank Hardy, Inc., Realtors, Charlottesville, VA

"Frascati"—the Barbour estate in Orange County, Virginia.

Barbour's decision not to oppose Jackson's candidate was undoubtedly a wise one. By stepping aside, he insured Jackson's reelection and strengthened his position within the party. His support for Jackson also increased the likelihood that he would be considered again for higher office. Barbour's name had been mentioned frequently as a possible Jackson appointee to the Supreme Court. The *Richmond Inquirer* found him "eminently fitted to adorn the Bench with his talents." Predictably, his political opponents dreaded the eventuality of a Barbour appointment. John Quincy Adams was particularly concerned that an aged Chief Justice Marshall might retire, and "some shallow-pated wild cat like Philip P. Barbour, fit for nothing but to tear the Union to rags and tatter" might be nominated by Jackson to succeed him. On July 6, 1835, Adams' fears came true; Chief Justice Marshall died in Philadelphia. However, Associate Justice Gabriel Duvall's resignation earlier in the year had provided President Jackson with another opening on the Court. On March 15, 1835 Jackson sent Barbour's name to the Senate as Duvall's successor.

Barbour was confirmed as an Associate Justice of the Court on May 7, 1836 by a vote of 30-11. On the same day he nominated Barbour, President Jackson nominated Taney to succeed Marshall. The opinion of the nation concerning these appointments was widely divided. Though southern newspapers applauded Barbour's elevation to the high court, a Boston editorial reflected northern sentiment—"If Mr. Barbour's appointment is extremely objectionable, what can be said of Mr. Taney?" The Jackson appointees soon joined to blunt the thrust of the Marshall Court's most expansive opinions. One Whig paper, lamenting the significant changes in the Court's rulings, blamed the shift on "such small lights as have recently been placed on the bench," specifically calling attention to "such shallow metaphysical hair-splitters as P.P. Barbour." Part of the majority in the *Charles River Bridge* case, Justice Barbour wrote the majority opinion for the Court in *Miln* v. *N.Y.* in 1837. The most important opinion penned for the Court by Barbour during his short five years on the high bench, Barbour vigorously upheld the authority of the State of New York to protect the health, safety and welfare of its citizens; as Barbour concluded, "the authority of the state is complete, unqualified and exclusive."

On the evening of February 24, 1841, Justice Barbour participated in a conference of the justices in Washington which lasted late into the evening. He apparently suffered a heart attack later that evening and was found dead in his bed the following morning. When the Court assembled, Chief Justice Taney announced that "Brother Barbour" had died and adjourned the Court. Although Barbour had lived the dignified life of a country gentleman at "Frascati," his family estate in Orange County, he was buried near the Chapel in Washington's Congressional Cemetery. Justice Story, writing to his wife shortly after Barbour's death, provided a fitting eulogy for his departed colleague. Story remembered Barbour as "a man of great integrity, of a very solid and acute understanding, of considerable legal attainments (in which he was daily improving), and altogether a very conscientious, upright, and laborious judge, whom we all respected for his talents and virtues, and his high sense of duty."

The Society gratefully acknowledges the substantial contribution in the preparation of this article of Marty Banks, a summer intern with the Society.

Society's Two Volume Index of Opinions Published

The first public reference work organizing and indexing Supreme Court opinions by author is now available to the public. The two volume series, sponsored by the Supreme Court Historical Society, and published last month by Kraus International Publications, is entitled *Supreme Court of the United States, 1789-1980: An Index of Opinions Arranged by Justice*. Its publication marks the culmination of years of research and editing by two seasoned Court veterans, Linda Blandford and Patricia Evans.

Unlike previous reference works, which have generally been organized by subject matter or case title, the new *Index* is arranged by individual justice, eliminating the need for an exhausting search of *U.S. Reports* or other sources to determine which opinions a particular justice may have written during his tenure on the Court. The *Index* lists in chronological order the opinions of each justice from 1789-1980. Perhaps the most useful work is the classification of opinions into seven categories: Opinions of the Court; Opinions Announcing Judgment; Separate Opinions; Concurring Opinions; Dissenting Opinions; Statements; and, Opinions as Circuit Justice. Each listing includes the complete case title and proper citation. The *Index* also contains an informative appendix which provides significant biographical material as well as a chart showing the succession of justices who have served on the Court.

The Society's Executive Director, Gary Aichele, and Marion Sader of Kraus-Thompson Publishing Company (center) present Chief Justice Warren E. Burger with the two-volume *Index to Opinions* edited by Patricia Russell Evans (right) and Linda A. Blandford (left).

The Index is available as a two-volume set in hard cover only, and may be purchased by Society members at a 20 percent discount. To order, members should contact the Society's headquarters at 111 Second Street, N.E., Washington, D.C. 20002, or telephone (202) 543-0400.

Members Get Special Offer On Society's Past Yearbooks

A special opportunity is now available to Society members who wish to complete their soft-bound *Yearbook* collections. A limited quantity of 1976-1982 *Yearbooks*, formerly priced at $10.00 per copy may be purchased by Society members for $4.00 each. Checks should be made payable to the Supreme Court Historical Society and mailed to 111 Second Street, N.E., Washington, D.C. 20002. Orders should clearly specify the number of copies of each year desired. Books will be mailed by library rate to the address provided with the order within two weeks of receipt. It would also be helpful to include a telephone number with your order. Don't miss this chance to acquire a complete set of *Yearbooks* at a bargain price!

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